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The Office of Special Counsel (OSC) Prohibited Personnel Practices List

The Office of Special Counsel (OSC) investigates allegations of prohibited personnel practices.

 

Download Prohibited Personnel Practices (PPP) Complaint Form (OSC-11).  This form can also be used to
complain retaliation for whistleblowing.

The following practices are prohibited by the federal government agencies under the Prohibited
Personnel Practices (PPP) Act:

(1) discriminate against an employee or applicant based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin,
age, handicapping condition, marital status, or political affiliation;  

 

Although OSC is authorized to investigate discrimination based upon race, color, religion, sex, national
origin, age, or handicapping condition, as well as reprisal for filing an EEO complaint, OSC generally defers
such allegations to agency procedures established under regulations issued by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 5 C.F.R. § 1810.1.  (This deferral policy does not apply to discrimination
claims outside the jurisdiction of the EEOC, such as complaints alleging discrimination based upon marital
status or political affiliation.) (See http://www.osc.gov/ppp.htm#q10.)

Filing a complaint with OSC will not relieve you of the obligation to file a complaint with the agency’s EEO
office within the time prescribed by EEOC regulations (at 29 C.F.R. Part 1614).

(2) solicit or consider employment recommendations based on factors other than personal knowledge
or records of job-related abilities or characteristics;

(3) coerce the political activity of any person;

(4) deceive or willfully obstruct anyone from competing for employment;

(5) influence anyone to withdraw from competition for any position so as to improve or injure the
employment prospects of any other person;

(6) give an unauthorized preference or advantage to anyone so as to improve or injure the employment
prospects of any particular employee or applicant;

(7) engage in nepotism (i.e., hire, promote, or advocate the hiring or promotion of relatives);

(8) engage in reprisal for whistleblowing – i.e., take, fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take a
personnel action with respect to any employee or applicant because of any disclosure of information by
the employee or applicant that he or she reasonably believes evidences a violation of a law, rule or
regulation; gross mismanagement; gross waste of funds; an abuse of authority; or a substantial and
specific danger to public health or safety (if such disclosure is not barred by law and such information is
not specifically required by Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or the
conduct of foreign affairs – if so restricted by law or Executive Order, the disclosure is only protected if
made to the Special Counsel, the Inspector General, or comparable agency official);

 

In order to allege retaliation arising from whistleblowing, you must first blow the whistle--that is, you must
make the "disclosure" of agency's wrongful acts.  See more on whistleblowing.

 

Download OSC-11 form: prohibited personnel practice complaint form or whistleblower
retaliation complaint form.

 

Download OSC-12 form: whistleblower disclosure form.

 

(9) take, fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take a personnel action against an employee or
applicant for exercising an appeal, complaint, or grievance right; testifying for or assisting another in
exercising such a right; cooperating with or disclosing information to the Special Counsel or to an
Inspector General; or refusing to obey an order that would require the individual to violate a law;

(10) discriminate based on personal conduct which is not adverse to the on-the-job performance of an
employee, applicant, or others; or

(11) take or fail to take, recommend, or approve a personnel action if taking or failing to take such an
action would violate a veterans’ preference requirement; and

(12) take or fail to take a personnel action, if taking or failing to take action would violate any law, rule or
regulation implementing or directly concerning merit system principles at 5 U.S.C. § 2301.

(Obtained from http://www.osc.gov/ppp.htm#q1)  

 

OSC receives, investigates, and prosecutes allegations of PPPs, with an emphasis on protecting federal government
whistleblowers.  OSC seeks corrective action remedies (such as back pay and reinstatement), by negotiation or from
the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), for injuries suffered by whistleblowers and other complainants.  OSC is
also authorized to file complaints at the MSPB to seek disciplinary action against individuals who commit PPPs.



All statements contained in this page are subject to change and update.  EEO 21 does not take responsibility for any
errors or misrepresentation contained therein.

MSPB Prohibited Personnel Practices List and Description

Prohibited Personnel Practices (5 USC § 2302(b))

Any employee who has authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action, shall not, with respect to such authority—

1. discriminate for or against any employee or applicant for employment—

A.     on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, as prohibited under section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e–16);

B.     on the basis of age, as prohibited under sections 12 and 15 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 631, 633a);

C.    on the basis of sex, as prohibited under section 6(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 206 (d));

D.    on the basis of handicapping condition, as prohibited under section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 791); or

E.     on the basis of marital status or political affiliation, as prohibited under any law, rule, or regulation;

1. solicit or consider any recommendation or statement, oral or written, with respect to any individual who requests or is under consideration for any personnel action unless such recommendation or statement is based on the personal knowledge or records of the person furnishing it and consists of—

 .       an evaluation of the work performance, ability, aptitude, or general qualifications of such individual; or

A.     an evaluation of the character, loyalty, or suitability of such individual;

1. coerce the political activity of any person (including the providing of any political contribution or service), or take any action against any employee or applicant for employment as a reprisal for the refusal of any person to engage in such political activity;
2. deceive or willfully obstruct any person with respect to such person's right to compete for employment;
3. influence any person to withdraw from competition for any position for the purpose of improving or injuring the prospects of any other person for employment;
4. grant any preference or advantage not authorized by law, rule, or regulation to any employee or applicant for employment (including defining the scope or manner of competition or the requirements for any position) for the purpose of improving or injuring the prospects of any particular person for employment;
5. appoint, employ, promote, advance, or advocate for appointment, employment, promotion, or advancement, in or to a civilian position any individual who is a relative (as defined in section 3110 (a)(3) of this title) of such employee if such position is in the agency in which such employee is serving as a public official (as defined in section 3110 (a)(2) of this title) or over which such employee exercises jurisdiction or control as such an official;
6. take or fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take, a personnel action with respect to any employee or applicant for employment because of—

 .       any disclosure of information by an employee or applicant which the employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences—

                               i.            a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or

                                                    ii.            gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety, if such disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law and if such information is not specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs; or

A.     any disclosure to the Special Counsel, or to the Inspector General of an agency or another employee designated by the head of the agency to receive such disclosures, of information which the employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences—

                                                        .            a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or

                                                       i.            gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety;

1. take or fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take, any personnel action against any employee or applicant for employment because of—

 .                   the exercise of any appeal, complaint, or grievance right granted by any law, rule, or regulation;

A.     testifying for or otherwise lawfully assisting any individual in the exercise of any right referred to in subparagraph (A);

B.     cooperating with or disclosing information to the Inspector General of an agency, or the Special Counsel, in accordance with applicable provisions of law; or

C.    for refusing to obey an order that would require the individual to violate a law;

1. discriminate for or against any employee or applicant for employment on the basis of conduct which does not adversely affect the performance of the employee or applicant or the performance of others; except that nothing in this paragraph shall prohibit an agency from taking into account in determining suitability or fitness any conviction of the employee or applicant for any crime under the laws of any State, of the District of Columbia, or of the United States;
2.  

 .                   knowingly take, recommend, or approve any personnel action if the taking of such action would violate a veterans' preference requirement; or

A.     knowingly fail to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action if the failure to take such action would violate a veterans' preference requirement; or

1. take or fail to take any other personnel action if the taking of or failure to take such action violates any law, rule, or regulation implementing, or directly concerning, the merit system principles contained in section 2301 of this title.

This subsection shall not be construed to authorize the withholding of information from the Congress or the taking of any personnel action against an employee who discloses information to the Congress.

DOD OIG Director of Whistleblowing and Transparency Was a Whistleblower

Thanks Old Navy Man,

I appreciate your contributions.   It is good to learn of someone who is trying to support whistleblowers instead of destroy them.  GFS

 

G Florence:

There are some good ones out there.  Dan is one.

An Old Navy Man

See article

Whistleblower sits in Defense IG office

By Jeremy Herb - 07/12/12 06:00 AM ET

at this link:

http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/army/237469-whistleblowers-have-one-of-their-own-in-dod-office

 

Whistleblowers (2011) claims DOD official is incompetent and tyrannical rings a sympathetic chord with DSS’s problems (2012)

 I ran across this story from August 29, 2011 (in my mail box, sent to me by a reader), which is remarkably like what I am being told is going on in DSS (Defense Security Service). 

 

Note similarities, those of you familiar with the problems DSS seems to be propagating at an alarming rate: 

 

Managers pushing out senior employees who have the knowledge, training and experience to do the job in order to make room for often unprepared, untrained, equally incompetent cronies from another work environment.  Cronyism can be hiring relatives, or can be hiring members of a same church, college class, club, or military service branch etc.  It does seem like DSS is having more than its share of such problems. 

 

It seems like within DSS, as in this story, some crony seeking managers like people around who can spy on other employees for them, and be loyal to the manager in charge, even if they aren’t capable of doing the job they ostensibly were hired to do.  In the case of DSS, how is this helping DSS protect our technology and oversee government contracts?  (Answer:  It’s not! But it may well be meeting the goals of certain defense contractors who don’t want any oversight anyway.)  GFS

 

 

 

See original article:

 

Whistleblowers:  DOD official incompetent, wasteful , ‘tyrannical’

 

Link to original:

 

http://thehill.com/news-by-subject/defense-homeland-security/178639-whistleblowers-charge-dod-official-with-incompetence-wasteful-spending-tyrannical-leadership

 

 

Got a DOD crony story?  Report it here – http://gflorencescott.wordpress.com

DSS and Boeing Continue Retribution Against DSS Security Specialist Despite DOD OIG Report

Thanks Old Navy Man for sending this.  It is a good follow up in one of the continuing stories I had been observing.  The Defense Security Service has truly reached the point of no salvation in this whistleblower supporter's opinion.  It just gets worse and worse.  I have a lot more I've been told or have been able to find out during my family emergency trips back east.  I'll be unrolling more stuff from this point forward.   Please do go to this link.  I see that POGO's Nick Schwellenbach included links to the DOD OIG's report concerning Mr. Conley's case from 2002-2008, where the DOD OIG validated and upheld Mr. Conley's concerns and that he has been fiercely retaliated against by DSS managers and it appears the director.  Mr. Conley has been on the receiving end of a vendetta for doing his job lawfully and trying to make sure a particular case was not covered up and would be prosecuted.  But because of the demonstrated actions of the defense contractor involved (Boeing) and the conflict of interest relationships certain managers in DSS have personally and professionally with Boeing,  and as it was discovered later, Boeing's relationships with other government managers and  defense agencies or activities, it has been a brutal uphill battle to assure integrity in the oversight process.  Start with reading all of this.  I will be publishing more later.    GFS

 

 

G Florence:
 
Please read this article    http://getinvolved.pogo.org/site/PageNavigator/dss_boeing_whistleblower.html

I just stumbled across this link to a very disturbing whistleblower article.  I did not see it posted at your site so I am forwarding it to you.  Please take the time read it.  I hope you will consider posting it with your comments.  This recent article is from the Project On Government Oversight.  As an old navy man I am incensed that the two government workers identified in this article have been persecuted by the Marine Corps, my Navy and the Defense Security Service for trying to do their jobs.  More people need to know what is going on in our government!
 
An Old Navy Man

DSS Director Ignores DoD OIG Report and Recommendations: Why?

I hear through my sources that the DoD OIG completed a Title V investigation (Reprisal Office) and issued a report of findings in support of the federal employee whistleblower.  I have obtained a copy of this report from my sources in the DC area.  I am wading through it as we speak.  It would appear that Stanley Sims, DSS Director and Jay Freaude, DSS Counsel are purposefully refusing to acknowledge receipt of this report and responsibility to take constructive action to make the damaged employee whole, as directed by the DoD OIG. 

Is this how it will work?  Defense Security Service Director, Legal Department and Management will ignore investigative reports and pretend the investigation from DoD OIG simply does not exist and continue on their unethical and illegal path with impunity?  There are some very angry federal employees and civilian citizens regarding this cavalier attitude toward justice.  Not to mention questions about what appears to be DSS malfeasance in managing a federal agency and expenditure of taxpayer funds. 

If Defense Security Service oversight cannot be ethical in its own in-house matters, how can they be trusted to be ethical in doing their oversight job of policing government defense contracting and contractor corporations?

Anybody have more information or perspective? 

GFS

DSS Continues to Hold "All-Hands" Meetings, Despite OSD Policy Change

 

A Rose by any other name is still a Rose"   (The same can be said for things that do not smell so sweet.)

As an update on the problem of expensive "all-hands" meetings,  I received information from several people in the DC area in answer to some questions I posed to them some time ago.  Nothing seems to have changed on that front, but the window dressing. 

Errant DSS management has continued to hold these meetings, requiring employees to travel to attend what still is the same event.  Now, however, it seems DSS management is calling them "trainings" to avoid requesting official authorization for expenditure of these funds by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as is now required for "all-hands" meetings.

No matter what title is put on it, a lecture is a lecture is a lecture.  Even worse, sitting and watching managers argue with each other for hours is beyond the pale.

Demanding employees leave their assigned work, travel across the country, to sit in a large room for days as an audience to a group of managers, while being brow beaten by those managers (or being told things that could just have easily been sent out in an email or handled more efficiently via a teleconference), shows extreme bad judgment in this blogger's opinion.  Their dedication to find a way to try to get around policy put into place to stop this travesty shows their astounding stubborn resolve to do as they like, not as they are told.  Why is no one holding them responsible?  It is amazing how the failures of these managers, appears to have nearly totally taken down this agency in such a relatively brief amount of time.

 

Where in the World is Kathleen Watson, Part 2

Here is a follow up on an earlier post this week.  Follow the link to see the contract.  Ms Watson was formerly a lawyer with the CIA, in human resources I believe.  Her recent area of interest has appeared to be intel.  -GFS

 

G. Florence,
 
Where in the world is Kathleen Watson?
 
G Florence you are sailing on course.  McNeil Technologies was awarded a $500 million dollar defense contract in September 2010.  The U.S. Special Operations Command five year linguist support services contract award is public knowledge.
 
http://www.defense.gov/contracts/contract.aspx?contractid=4366
 
How is Kathleen Watson and the Defense Security Service connected?  Stay tuned.
 
The Old Navy Man

 

For those who want a quick view of the announcement:

Found on defense.gov on March 30, 2011 by GFS as advised by Old Navy Man on 3/29/11.

 

CONTRACTS

U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

                McNeil Technologies, Inc., Springfield, Va., has been awarded a $500,000,000 maximum value, five-year indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity linguist support services contract by U.S. Special Operations Command.  The contractor will provide all personnel, equipment, tools, materials, supervision/management, and other items and services necessary to provide foreign language interpretation, transcription, reporting, and translation services to support overseas contingency operations.  The initial obligation amount is $50,000,000 for the first task order.  The contract number is H92222-10-D-0007.

 

 

Where in the World is Former DSS Director, Kathleen Watson?

Former DSS Director, Kathleen Watson, accepts job with McNeil Technologies, Virgina

The word on the street is that she has quick as a bunny, hopped right over to a defense contractor and is now in their employ.  Doesn’t anyone have to adhere anymore to the six months to a year wait period before leaving a government oversight job and jumping right into a contract with a defense contractor?  I hear that a lucrative contract was awarded by the government the very same day Watson signed her new contract with the contractor. 

 

Check out her new digs at McNeil Technologies in Virginia:

 

http://www.mcneiltech.com/

 

 

 

Defense Logistics Agency Audits Found Lacking: They want to combine DSS with this one?

A contributor sent this in today.  Thanks!  I appreciate contributions from my readers.  It seems like I have heard nothing good about DSS for a very long time, other than the management has seemingly been successful at pulling the wool over any number of politicians eyes.  It is one long progression of bad decision after bad decision from this observer's perspective.  GFS

 

G. Florence-

Rumors on the contracting street back here in the beltway are that the Defense Security Service and its industrial security mission will be handed back to the Defense Logistics Agency.  Some agency employees have shared,  that the employee pay and benefits program has already been given back to the Defense Logistics Agency.  Handing a failing agency back to another failing agency doesn't seem like a very good idea to this old navy man.  Isn't it time for the agencies who actually own the programs to take back ownership of their programs?

 The Old Navy Man 

 

The Washington Post

Report criticizes defense agency’s auditing

By Robert O'Harrow Jr., Sunday, March 20, 6:54 PM

 

It is supposed to be an A Team that keeps a close eye on the Defense Logistics Agency, the $41 billion-a-year operation that supplies Meals Ready-to-Eat, uniforms, spare parts and just about everything else to troops around the world.

But the agency’s accountability office does F-grade work when it comes to conducting audits, according to a recent report by the Pentagon’s Inspector General.

Many of the audits are improperly performed. Investigators often do not have enough auditing experience and don’t follow generally accepted government auditing standards. In six of eight offices reviewed, planning was found to be deficient, according to the report.

 

“As a result of the significant deficiencies described . . . we are issuing a fail opinion on the DLA audit organization’s system of quality control,” said Randolph R. Stone, deputy inspector general for policy and oversight.

 

The DLA did not respond to requests for comment.

The IG report raises questions about the Pentagon’s ability to properly oversee contractors vital to its far-flung operations.

 

For years, Congress has heard testimony that the Pentagon’s logistics operations are hampered by questionable practices, poor planning and overpriced goods and services. The DLA’s accountability office contributes to the problem by failing in its oversight role, the findings conclude.

 

“The report confirms the alarming trend we are seeing where Pentagon management has relegated audits of contracts and internal controls to a back seat,” said Danielle Brian, executive director of the Project On Government Oversight, a private nonpartisan oversight organization that tracks Pentagon spending. “Despite rhetoric to the contrary, senior DOD leadership has been on a tear to reduce or even eliminate any type of audit oversight, whether related to contractors or DOD’s own internal controls.”

The DLA faces a mammoth task. Its 27,000 employees provide support to nearly 1,900 weapons systems and eight supply chains moving 5 million items. The wars in the Middle East have added to the strain.

 

The accountability office was formed in early 2008 to focus investigators and auditors on improving “efficiency, accountability and warfighter support.”

 

The IG criticism deals with the quality control of audits, which are crucial to identifying theft, fraud and other abuses. The IG report found an “absence of official quality control policies and procedures” and a lack of independence among auditors.

 

The report notes that only “one quality assurance auditor position” was established, in late 2009, but that person has not conducted “any reviews of DLA audit work and therefore could not provide any evidence of quality assurance monitoring.”

The IG made nine recommendations, including calling for revisions of the audit policies. The DLA agreed with all nine, the report said.

 

“We determined that the DLA audit organization did not exercise professional judgment due to the vast array of noncompliances,” the report said. “The DLA Accountability Office, Audit Division, and the DLA Disposition Services audit offices did not have a clear understanding of what constituted an audit.”

 

Link to original: 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/report-criticizes-defense-agencys-auditing/2011/03/18/AB4kT02_story.html